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CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES

CPLR 203(b)(5): Sixty-day toll available for contractual limitation period provided that delivery of the summons and complaint
upon proper official is effectuated within the contractual limitation period
CPLR 203(b)(5) allows a plaintiff to receive an automatic
sixty-day extension of the applicable statute of limitations merely
by -delivering the summons and complaint to the appropriate
county sheriff or clerk.' Use of this tolling provision is widespread
CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1972 Supp. 1987). Section 203(b)(5) provides in part:
(b) Claim in complaint. A claim asserted in the complaint is interposed
against the defendant or a co-defendant united in interest with him when: ...
5. The summons is delivered to the sheriff of that county outside the
city of New York or is filed with the clerk of that county within the city
of New York in which the defendant resides, is employed or is doing
business, or if none of the foregoing is known to the plaintiff after reasonable inquiry, then of the county in which the defendant is known to
have last resided, been employed or been engaged in business, or in
which the cause of action arose; or if the defendant is a corporation, of a
county in which it may be served or in which the cause of action arose;
provided that:
(i) The summons is served upon the defendant within sixty
days after the period of limitation would have expired but for
this provision ....
Id.
CPLR 203(b)(5), originally CPLR 203(b)(4), was enacted in 1962. Ch. 308, § 203, [1962]
N.Y. Laws 1303. The provision is derived from sections 17 and 21 of the repealed New York
Civil Practice Act. See FIFTH REP. at 32.
Compliance with the provisions of CPLR 203(b)(5) extends not only to the statutes of
limitations set forth in the CPLR, but to those in other chapters of New York law, as long
as the provisions of CPLR 203 are not inconsistent with those other provisions. See, e.g.,
Clough v. Board of Educ., 56 App. Div. 2d 233, 234-36, 392 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172-73 (4th Dep't
1977) (one year and 90-day period of limitation prescribed in GML 50-i extended by sixtyday tolling period of CPLR 203(b)(5)). In order to benefit from the sixty-day extension, the
summons must be delivered to the appropriate sheriff or clerk and not to a state marshal or
special deputy. See 1 WK&M 1 203.14, at 2-111. In federal court, delivery to the district
court's clerk has been held to be the equivalent to service upon a county sheriff. See Gold v.
Jeep Corp., 579 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The court noted that a federal litigant in
a diversity action does not have to depend on the services of a state official where that
litigant is not seeking greater substantive rights than he would be accorded in a state court.
See id. at 259. If the summons in a state court action is delivered to the wrong sheriff or
filed with the county clerk of an improper county, the delivery is deemed insufficient. See
Roberts v. Schuh, 55 Misc. 2d 996, 997, 287 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (Sup. Ct. Orange County
1968) (60-day tolling provision inapplicable when summons delivered to sheriff of wrong
county). Literally, the sixty-day extension is to be tacked onto the end of whatever limitations period otherwise remains. However, despite the statutory language, some authorities
believe that section 203(b)(5) only gives an alternative sixty-days, measured from delivery to
the proper official. See SIEGEL § 47, at 48.
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because New York, unlike other jurisdictions, does not consider an
action commenced until service of the summons has been completed.2 Despite the restrictive language contained in CPLR 2011
on the applicability of the article 2 limitations periods, use of the
CPLR 203(b)(5) tolling provision has received judicial approval in
a variety of actions.4 Recently, in Berkshire Life Insurance Co. v.
2 Compare CPLR 304 (McKinney 1972) (action commenced and jurisdiction acquired

by service of summons) with FED. R. Crv. P. 3 (action commenced by fling of a complaint)
and N.J. Civ. P.R. 4:2-2 (West 1987) (civil action commenced by filing complaint with court);
see also Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 288, 461 N.E.2d 1253,
1255, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 768 (1984) (action is commenced when service is effected pursuant
to appropriate authorized method); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
306, 448 N.E.2d 86, 92, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 238 (1983) (civil action not commenced by filing
complaint, but is commenced upon service).
3 CPLR 201 (McKinney 1972). Section 201 provides that:
An action, including one brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, must
be commenced within the time specified in this article unless a different time is
prescribed by law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement. No court
shall extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action.
Id. The purpose of the limitations periods enumerated in article 2 is to compel a plaintiff to
bring his claim in a timely fashion while giving a defendant prompt notice and eliminating
the uncertainty surrounding stale claims. See Vastola v. Maer, 48 App. Div. 2d 561, 564, 370
N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 1019, 1021, 355 N.E.2d 300, 300, 387
N.Y.S.2d 246, 246 (1976).
Notwithstanding the public policy of giving repose to human affairs, the CPLR does
provide for extensions and tollings of the statutes of limitations. See, e.g., CPLR 207 (McKinney 1972) (defendant outside state when action accrues, statute of limitations tolled until return); CPLR 208 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (infancy and insanity of plaintiffs
result in tolling).
See, e.g., Zarcone v. Condie, 62 F.R.D. 563, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (CPLR 203(b)(5)
extension available in wrongful death action); S & J Deli, Ltd. v. New York Property Ins.
Underwriting Ass'n, 119 App. Div. 2d 652, 652, 501 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (2d Dep't 1986) (tolling
available to extend insurance contract limitation period); Place v. Schwartz, 100 App. Div.
2d 963, 963, 475 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (2d Dep't 1984) (mem.) (60-day extension proper in personal injury action); see also Cohoes Bronze Co., Inc. v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 243 App.
Div. 224, 225, 276 N.Y.S. 619, 621 (3d Dep't 1935) (applying § 17 of Civil Practice Act to
insurance policy contest); cf. In re Selwyn Realty Corp., 184 App. Div. 355, 358-363, 170
N.Y.S. 491, 493-96 (1st Dep't) (§ 399 of Code of Civil Procedure, an early statutory section
allowing service on sheriff, applied to Lien Law action), aff'd mem., 224 N.Y. 559, 120 N.E.
876 (1918).
It should be noted, however, that New York courts have not uniformly granted the
sixty-day tolling of CPLR 203(b)(5). See, e.g., De Luca v. New York City Transit Auth., 119
Misc. 2d 523, 523, 464 N.Y.S.2d 340, 340-41 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (extension unavailable in personal injury action against Port Authority because of compact between New York
and New Jersey); Garr v. State, 102 Misc. 2d 350, 353, 423 N.Y.S.2d 407, 409-10 (Ct. Cl.
1979) (tolling provision not applicable to service of notice of intention under § 10 of Court
of Claims Act); Family Bargain Centers, Inc. v. Village of Herkimer, 56 Misc. 2d 768, 770,
290 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1968) (60-day toll not available to extend
time limitation under GML).
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Fernandez,5 the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that
use of the section 203(b)(5) extension period was available to the
plaintiff where, pursuant to Insurance Law section 3203(a)(3),6 the
limitation period for commencing an action was fixed by an insurance contract. 7 In Fernandez, the plaintiff insurance company issued a policy on the life of the defendant-husband on November 5,
1982.8 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff received notification of the
insured's disappearance.9 Prior to the expiration of the two-year
incontestability period' 0 contained in the policy, the plaintiff insti124 App. Div. 2d 120, 511 N.Y.S.2d 348 (2d Dep't 1987).
6 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(a)(3) (McKinney 1985); see infra note 10 and accompanying
text.
Fernandez, 124 App. Div. 2d at 121, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
" See id. at 121, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
0 Id.
Charles Fernandez, the insured, disappeared while fishing off the coast of Florida
on November 13, 1982, eight days after the policy was issued. Id.
0 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(a)(3)
(McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1987). This section
provides:
(a) All life insurance policies, except as otherwise stated herein, delivered or issued for delivery in this state, shall contain in substance the following provisions,
or provisions which the superintendent deems to be more favorable to policyholders: ...
(3) that the policy shall be incontestable after being in force during the life of
the insured for a period of two years from its date of issue ....
Id. This statement, which is required to be in every life insurance policy, is commonly
known as an "incontestability clause." 18 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 72:1 (rev. ed.
1983); 1A J. APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 311 (1981). "The word 'incontestable,' as used in policies providing that they shall become incontestable, means indisputable,
and amounts to a guaranty that no objection shall be taken to defeat the policy on the death
of the person whose life was insured." 18 G. COUCH, supra, § 72:1 (footnote omitted).
The use of the incontestability clause in insurance policies first achieved widespread use
in the United States in 1879. See L. VILLARONGA, THE INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 12 (1976). Insurance companies adopted the use of these clauses in response to
negative public opinion concerning unfavorable policy provisions, and to gain a competitive
advantage over those companies that did not adopt such clauses. Id. at 14-15. The primary
benefit of the clause to the insured is that after the policy has been in effect for two years,
the insurer cannot contest its validity on the grounds that the insured obtained the policy
by fraudulent misrepresentations. See Berkshire Life Ins. Co. v. Weinig, 290 N.Y. 6, 8-10, 47
N.E.2d 418, 420-21 (1943); see generally 18 G. COUCH, supra, § 72:2 (purpose of clause is to
nullify warranties and conditions that might defeat insured's rights after stipulated time
passes). However, should the insured die before the clause has expired, the insurer has a
continuing right to contest the policy on the grounds of misrepresentation. See Simon v.
Government Employees Life Ins. Co., 79 App. Div. 2d 705, 705, 434 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (2d
Dep't 1980) (mem.) Although the clause is made a part of the policy, it is not entirely a
contractual provision, and is considered to some extent to be a statute of limitations. See 1A
J. APPELMAN, supra, at 312. "The incontestable clauses are enforced with particularity by
the courts because of the desirable purpose which they have. It is their purpose to put a
checkmate upon litigation; to prevent, after the lapse of a certain period of time, an expensive resort to the courts ....
Id. at 311. Inclusion of incontestability clauses is now re-
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tuted this action to rescind the policy, maintaining that the defendant-husband had fraudulently misrepresented the condition of
his health in his insurance application.1 1 On October 5, 1984, the
plaintiff delivered copies of the summons and complaint to the
sheriff, pursuant to CPLR 203(b) (5), in order to receive a sixty-day
extension of the incontestability period. 12 Service was not accomplished until December 15, 1984, more than two years after the
policy had been issued. 1 3 Consequently, the defendant-wife moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that service was untimely
as the summons and complaint were not delivered until after the
incontestability period had expired.' 4 Finding that the sixty-day
extension of CPLR 203(b)(5) was unavailable to extend a contractual limitations period, Supreme Court, Special Term, granted the
motion to dismiss.' 5 However, on plaintiff's motion for reargument,
6
the court vacated its prior decision and reinstated the complaint.'
The Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously affirmed Special Term's denial of the defendant-wife's motion to disquired by statute in a majority of states. See Developments in Georgia Law-Insurance:
Incontestability Clauses in Georgia Insurance Contracts, 13 GA. L. REv. 850, 853 & n.19
(1979).
" Fernandez, 124 App. Div. 2d at 121, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 349. The New York Court of
Appeals, in a memorandum opinion, has affirmed a lower court holding that an applicant's
material misrepresentation when answering health questions in a life insurance application
is enough to defeat recovery. See Barrett v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 58 App. Div. 2d
320, 323-24, 396 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851-52 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'd mem., 44 N.Y.2d 872, 873, 378
N.E.2d 1047, 1047, 407 N.Y.S.2d 478, 478 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979).
12 Fernandez, 124 App. Div. 2d at 121, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
-3Id. at 122, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 349. The plaintiff had attempted to serve the defendants
during October of 1984, and if this service had been successful, it clearly would have been
valid under the restrictions of the incontestability clause. Id. at 121, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
Before service was effectuated, the defendant-wife, Mary Ann Fernandez, who was the beneficiary of the policy, moved for dismissal on December 10, 1984. Id. The defendant-wife
contended that the attempted services were flawed and that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over either of the defendants. Id. at 122, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 349. During the pendency
of the the dismissal motion, the defendant-wife was personally served on December 15,
1984. Id. Thereafter, pursuant to court order, the absentee defendant-husband was served
on January 2, 1985 by certified mail addressed to Mary Ann Fernandez. Id. Thus, both
defendants were served after the expiration of the two-year period contained in the incontestability clause, but within the sixty-day extension period allotted by CPLR 203(b)(5). Id.
at 122-23, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 349-50.
14 Id. at 122, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
15Id. at 123, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 350. The Supreme Court, Special Term, without citing
authority, stated that the CPLR 203(b)(5) tolling provision was "not applicable to a contractual agreement between the parties." Id.
"I Id. On reargument, Special Term held that the two-year incontestability period of
the policy had been extended by delivery of the summons and complaint to the sheriff. Id.
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Writing for the court, Justice Mangano held

that the incontestability clause was, in effect, a statute of limitations,18 and, as such, the tolling provision of CPLR 203(b)(5) was
available to afford the plaintiff an additional sixty days in which to
accomplish service.' 9 The court, in reaching its decision, relied
heaviliy on the opinion of the Appellate Division, First Department, in Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co. of New York v.
Kliever,20 where the First Department addressed issues similar to
those presented in Fernandez.21 In light of the pervasive application that CPLR 203(b)(5) has received in the past,22 it is submitted
that the Appellate Division, Second Department, correctly adjudicated the appeal in the Fernandez action. Furthermore, a continued broad application of CPLR 203(b)(5) is needed to insure that
plaintiffs receive a judicial determination of their claims when attempting to serve problematic defendants. However, it is suggested
that the need for a CPLR 203(b)(5) extension would be obviated
by changing the New York view that deems a civil action commenced only upon delivery of the summons to the defendant.23
17Id. at 125, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
-8 Id. at 124, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 350 (citing Berkshire Life Ins. Co. v. Weinig, 290 N.Y. 6,
10, 47 N.E.2d 418, 421 (1943)). New York has long recognized the similarities between an
incontestability clause and a statute of limitations. See, e.g., Killian v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 44, 49, 166 N.E. 798, 800 (1929) (clause is akin to statute of limitations);
Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Ass'n, 118 N.Y. 237, 243, 23 N.E. 186, 187 (1890) (incontestability clauses and statutes of limitations serve similar purposes).
19 See Fernandez, 124 App. Div. 2d at 125, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 351. After delivery of process to the sheriff "within the contestability period, the plaintiff was afforded an additional
60 days after the incontestability period had expired, i.e., until January 4, 1985, to commence the instant action." Id. (citation omitted).
20 83 App. Div. 2d 805, 442 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1st Dep't 1981) (mem.).
21 Fernandez, 124 App. Div. 2d at 124, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 350-51. In Unionmutual, the
plaintiff-insurer instituted an action to rescind a life insurance policy on the ground that the
defendant-insured obtained the policy through fraudulent misrepresentation. Unionmutual,
83 App. Div. 2d 805, 806, 442 N.Y.S.2d 6, 6 (1st Dep't 1981). The plaintiff's suit was commenced by the filing of the summons and complaint with the New York County Clerk pursuant to CPLR 203(b)(5), but service upon the defendant-insured was not completed until
after the policy's two-year incontestability period had expired. Id. at 806, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
Relying on New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dickler, 135 Misc. 594, 238 N.Y.S. 684 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1929), aff'd mem., 229 App. Div. 775, 242 N.Y.S. 909 (1st Dep't 1930), the
Unionmutualcourt held that "a delivery of a summons to the sheriff of the county in which
defendant resided, two days before the expiration of the period set forth in the incontestability clause[,] was effective[] to commence the action even though personal service was not
effected until many days later." Unionmutual, 83 App. Div. 2d at 806, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
22 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
23 See CPLR 203, commentary at 114 (McKinney 1972). "The basic rule is that the
service of the summons stops the statute of limitations upon all causes of action pleaded in
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Moreover, the New York Legislature should adopt a more progressive approach, as embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which deems the commencement of an action to occur upon
the filing of the complaint with the clerk of the court.24
The unavailability of the CPLR 203(b)(5) extension has been
limited by the courts to those instances where compliance with the
time limitation, as fixed by law, is deemed to be a condition precedent to the existence of a cause of action.2 5 In determining whether
a time period is a condition precedent or a statute of limitations,
some courts have utilized the "creation of a new right of action"
test.26 Accordingly, if the legislature creates a new right of action
unknown at common law, and the same statute imposes a limitations period, this period will be deemed a condition precedent to
bringing suit.2 7 A litigant who has failed to observe these time limithe complaint." Id. See also Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283,
288, 461 N.E.2d 1253, 1255, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 768 (1984) (action will not be commenced
until there has been proper service); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d
293, 306, 448 N.E.2d 86, 92, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 238 (1983) (civil action is not instituted by
filing of complaint, but is commenced only upon service, delivery or filing of summons).
24 See FED. R. Civ. P. 3; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 5(e) (filing with clerk constitutes filing
with court). Rule 3 simply provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 3. Thereafter, the clerk of the court issues a summons, see
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a), and a plainfiff is afforded 120 days, from the date of issuance of the
summons, in which to effectuate service. See FED. R Civ. P. 4(j).
At first glance, the differences between the federal method and the New York method
may not appear significant. However, the differences are readily apparent in the situation
where the summons and complaint are filed with the court on the day the statute of limitations is due to expire. The federal litigant would be given 120 days in which to serve his
summons and an extension may be available if "good cause" is shown. See FED. R. Civ. P.
4(j). In New York, only if the plaintiff delivers the summons to the proper sheriff or clerk is
he afforded an additional sixty days in which to serve the defendant. See CPLR 203(b)(5)
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). This sixty-day difference could have a meaningful effect on
the plaintiff's ablility to interpose his claim. Furthermore, New York's adoption of the federal method would obviate the need for CPLR 203(b)(5) altogether.
25 See, e.g., Savino v. Demiglia, 133 App. Div. 2d 389, 390, 519 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (2d
Dep't 1987) (mem.) (commencing action within one year is condition precedent to bringing
suit against Port Authority); Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 86 App. Div. 2d 658, 659,
446 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (2d Dep't) (CPLR 203(b)(5) does not apply to action under Warsaw
Convention where bringing of suit within two years is condition precedent), aff'd mem., 57
N.Y.2d 767, 440 N.E.2d 1339, 454 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1982); De Luca v. New York City Transit
Auth., 119 Misc. 2d 523, 523, 464 N.Y.S.2d 340, 340-41 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (oneyear limit for claims against Port Authority tantamount to condition precedent).
26 See, e.g., Romano v. Romano, 19 N.Y.2d 444, 447, 227 N.E.2d 389, 391, 280 N.Y.S.2d
570, 573 (1967) (if statute creating action attaches time limit for commencement, that is
part of the cause of action); Cimo v. State, 306 N.Y. 143, 150, 116 N.E.2d 290, 294 (1953)
(when legislature creates new cause of action and includes a time limit in statute, action is
subject to that limitation alone).
27 See Cimo, 306 N.Y. at 150, 116 N.E.2d at 294. Although this approach has been
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tations has not satisfied the condition precedent to bringing suit,
and this omission, like the failure to observe a statute of limitations generally, will warrant a dismissal of the action. 8 Applying
this test to the Fernandez case, it would appear that an incontestability clause, although a creation of statute, is not in the nature of
a condition precedent. A suit on an insurance policy is merely a
breach of contract action,29 an action not unknown at common law;
hence, the tolling provisions of CPLR article 2 are applicable to
extend a limitations period fixed in an insurance policy."s
The broad and consistent application of CPLR 203(b)(5) has
again achieved an equitable result, as evidenced by the Appellate
Division, Second Department, decision in Fernandez. However,
even a continuing application of CPLR 203(b)(5) may not assure
service within the requisite period when a plaintiff is confronted
with an evasive defendant or a condition precedent to suit. It is
suggested, therefore, that the more progressive federal approach,
which deems an action commenced upon filing of the complaint, be
adopted in New York.
John M. Wilson

taken by a number of courts, it is not an absolute. For instance, a wrongful death action, an
action unknown at common law, has a two-year limitations period. EPTL § 5-4.1 (McKinney Supp. 1988). This period, however, is a statute of limitations, not a condition precedent.
Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., 214 N.Y. 101, 110, 108 N.E. 217, 220 (1915). Conversely, an
action for personal injuries brought under the Warsaw Convention must be brought within
two years; a failure to bring an action within this period is a failure of a condition precedent
to bringing suit. See Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 82 App. Div. 2d 696, 709, 443
N.Y.S.2d 79, 87 (2d Dep't 1981). The Kahn court, instead of focusing on whether or not the
Warsaw Convention created a new cause of action, looked towards the intent of the Convention's drafters. Id. In this regard the Kahn court stated:
[R]egardless of whether or not the Convention itself "creates" any causes of action, it is readily apparent that the time limitation incorporated in article 29 was
intended to be in the nature of a condition precedent to suit, and that it was never
intended to be extended or tolled by infancy or other incapacity.
Id.
28 See id. at 709-10, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88.
29 See Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 374, 146 N.E. 630, 632 (1925) (insurance is personal contract to indemnify insured); Lett v. Guardian Fire Ins. Co., 125 N.Y. 82,
86, 25 N.E. 1088, 1089 (1890) (insurance policy is "distinctly a personal contract"); 1 G.
COUCH, supra note 10, § 1:1.
s See, e.g., S & J Deli, Ltd. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 119 App.
Div. 2d 652, 652, 501 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (2d Dep't 1986) (two-year statutory period in which to
bring action on fire insurance policy not condition precedent); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.
Co. of N.Y. v. Kliever, 83 App. Div. 2d 805, 806, 442 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (1st Dep't 1981) (twoyear incontestability clause in life insurance policy is statute of limitations).

